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Revising the Arbitration Clause in Real Estate Contracts 
Roger Bernhardt and Jon H. Sylvester 
NOTE: Hedges v Carrigan (2004) 117 CA4th 578, 11 CR3d 787, reported in 27 CEB RPLR 107 
(July 2004), dealt mainly with the issue of federal preemption of California’s CCP §1298 on 
arbitration clause drafting. But, for me, it generated many questions about the right of brokers to 
compel their clients to arbitrate which I could not answer because (1) the opinion was only 
partially published, and (2) the issues required a deeper knowledge of contract law than I 
possessed. I solved the first problem by obtaining the balance of the opinion and the underlying 
contract document from William Turner, counsel for the broker. I dealt with the second by 
inviting my colleague, Professor Jon Sylvester, to collaborate with me in writing this column.  
—Roger Bernhardt 
The parties’ contract in this case was a standard CAR Residential Purchase form that included 
a clause providing that buyer and seller would arbitrate any disputes between them if they both 
initialed that clause. Only the buyers initialed, but ecause the litigation that ensued was between 
the buyers and the broker, the combination of the buyers’ initials and the lack of space for the 
broker’s initials led us to wonder whether the court’s holding that the broker could not compel 
arbitration was based on the absence of his initials, the absence of the seller’s initials, or both. 
Then, in the unpublished part of the opinion, we read the court’s statement that “[b]ecause 
neither the Weinmans [sellers] nor Mr. Carrigan [broker] initialed the arbitration agreement, it is 
not enforceable against plaintiffs [buyers].” This is not as clear as we would wish. Was the court 
imposing an affirmative requirement that both the seller and the broker had to initial the clause 
for it to be enforceable by the broker against the buyer? Or was it merely saying that, because 
neither the seller nor the broker initialed the form, the clause was unenforceable? Were both sets 
of initials really necessary? Did the absence of the seller’s initials mean only that the buyer could 
not force the seller to arbitrate, or that neither of them could force the other to arbitrate, or did it 
completely invalidate the clause—even with respect to the broker? 
Regarding the CAR form in this case, the intent of the form drafters was clear—at least as to 
broker disputes: Like most arbitration clauses in buy-sell contracts, the clause in the CAR form 
called for only the buyer and seller—the true parties to the deal—to initial. It referred only to 
disputes arising “between them,” i.e., buyer and seller. Broker disputes were covered in a 
separate clause, which was located below the clause to be initialed, and that clause did requi  
and provide space for the initials of anyone: buyer, s ller, or broker. (The 2002 CAR form adds a 
proviso that the broker arbitration paragraph applies “whether or not the Arbitration provision is 
initialed,” which would seem to make the result desired by the form’s drafters even clearer. The 
form then weakens that very point, however, by placing the boxes for initials below the broker 
arbitration clause! Nevertheless, it seems apparent that, one way or another, brokers are able to 
demand arbitration without having initialed the form.) 
In a dispute between buyer and seller, it might seem clear that a buyer who had initialed the 
clause could not enforce it against a seller who had not. But could the seller enforce the clause 
against the buyer in that situation? One case does h ld that a single signature on an arbitration 
clause lets the non-signer enforce it against the signer if the contract is otherwise enforceable. 
See Grubb & Ellis Co. v Bello (1993) 19 CA4th 231, 23 CR2d 281. However, other courts have 
disagreed with that conclusion (see, .g., Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv. Brokerage Co. v 
Hock (1998) 68 CA4th 83, 80 CR2d 147), and in at least some circumstances (notably in the 
employment context), California courts have held clauses requiring one party to arbitrate while 
the other retains the option of suing in court to be unconscionable. See Armendarizv Foundation 
Health Psychcare Servs. (2000) 24 C4th 83, 99 CR2d 745. But whatever the outcome between 
the buyer and the seller, it is a separate question whether the absence of the seller’s initials makes 
the clause unenforceable against the buyer by the broker. 
Even before the proviso was added to the 2002 CAR form—and afortiori afterward—the 
wording and positioning of the broker arbitration clause was designed to make clear that the 
buyer and seller should not expect the absence of either of their initials to render the clause 
ineffective in a dispute between either of them ando e of their brokers. But while the parties’ 
expectations are important in contract interpretation, they are not dispositive; and here, the form 
was not drafted by either of the principal parties, but by a third party broker. This is why, 
although the intent is clear, that intent might warrant additional scrutiny. 
As mentioned above, California courts disfavor clauses that commit one party to arbitration 
and leave the other free to sue in court. This lackof “bilaterality” poses an even larger problem 
when the broker—declared in the contract not to be a party to it (as here)—can still sue in court 
even though the buyer and seller cannot. Even granting that the arbitration clause remains 
effective despite the lack of the seller’s initials, does that necessarily mean that the broker can 
compel arbitration against the buyer? 
Because the broker is declared not to be a party to the contract, it is unlikely that the buyer or 
seller could compel the broker to arbitrate a dispute with either of them. Can the broker still 
compel one of them to arbitrate a dispute with him? Point-by-point reciprocity is not required for 
a contract to be enforceable, as long as each side has given consideration so as to make the other 
side’s obligations enforceable. In this case, however, the broker has neither given nor promised 
anything. 
The CAR form—both new and old—imposes arbitration on a broker who has “agreed to such 
mediation or arbitration prior to or within a reasonable time after the dispute or claim is 
presented” to the broker. That means that the buyer and seller must agree now, but the broker 
need not agree (or decide to agree) until later. It is not that the broker has made an illusory 
promise; it’s worse: He has promised nothing at all. (The broker might claim to be a third party 
beneficiary of the language “buyer and seller agree . . . to arbitrate disputes . . . involving . . . 
brokers,” but that runs afoul of the bilaterality requirement.) The clause fails not because the 
seller did not initial it or because the broker didnot initial it, either, but because the broker would 
not be bound even if he had put his initials down next to it, since his decision-making moment 
comes later, when the claim is asserted. Indeed, th clause backfires because, in trying to give the 
broker a unilateral option not to arbitrate, it effectively denies him the right to demand 
arbitration—which is surely more desirable than the right to refuse arbitration. 
This brings us to the published part of the opinion, which dealt with the preemption issue. The 
court majority concluded that California’s special statutory requirements for arbitration clauses 
are invalid as inconsistent with federal law. The state can no longer require separate initialing, as 
CCP §1298 currently does. But the federal act—United States Arbitration Act (9 USC §2)—does 
not mandate arbitration, it only invalidates state imposition of such special requirements on 
arbitration clauses. While the court’s preemption analysis prohibits a statutory requirement that 
arbitration clauses be separately initialed, the parties themselves remain free to provide in their 
contract that the arbitration clause is effective only if separately initialed. Even if CCP §1298 
were repealed entirely, contracts and printed forms could include optional arbitration agreements 
requiring separate initialing. 
Given that brokers have more influence over the contents of printed forms than do buyers and 
sellers, it may well be that residential contract forms will drop the requirement of separate initials 
on the arbitration clauses (unless the Commissioner f Real Estate prohibits that). Brokers want 
arbitration not so much because it is biased in their favor as because it reduces their dispute 
resolution costs, which—as repeat players—is quite important to them. The combination of 
federal preemption of the statute and economic incentiv  by the form drafters may be the one-
two punch that kills off arbitration clauses that hve to be initialed to take effect. 
Based on what we have said, however, that won’t help brokers very much. The problem with 
the CAR clause is not too few initials, but too much discretion. (In that respect, we agree with 
Judge Mosk’s concurring opinion that there was no need to discuss preemption.) If brokers want 
arbitration, they should delete their option not to arbitrate and make it mandatory for themselves 
as well as their principals. Once that is done, initialing would not matter. On this issue, what the 
legislature does about its statutory arbitration act is far less important than how the CAR and the 
legal publishers revise their form contracts. 
 
